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The Future of the Confrontation
Clause: Semiautonomous and
Autonomous Machine Witnesses
Brian Sites*
ABSTRACT

How should the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
be interpretedas to machine witnesses? Courts across the country have
resisted efforts to cross-examine the human agents who assist machines
that generate data used in criminal trials. Such challenges under the
Confrontation Clause have been rejected directly and in great number,
and the rules of evidence are largely being read to not require the
testimony of those who have the best information about the machine's
use for the case at hand. This problem arises in an era of machine
exceptionalism and widespread use. From increasingly sophisticated
forensic lab tools to crime scene drones, these machines are growing in
prevalence. Meanwhile, other machines that operate with little-to-no
human assistance, such as surveillancecameras and wearables, are also
on the rise. As new technologies creep further into numerous aspects of
public and private space, human witnesses are less and less necessary to
criminal trials. Increasingly, machines are created for the specific
purpose of making assertions about reality in place of humans. Courts,
however, have held that the Confrontation Clause largely does not reach
those machine accusers. This Article argues that, in light of these
changes, courts should reinterpret the Confrontation Clause to provide
a right to "confront"machine accusers.
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"A crime lab's reliance on [machine accusers] may be a marked
improvement over less accurate or more subjective methods of
determining blood-alcohol levels. The allure of such technology is its
infallibility, its precision, its incorruptibility.But .. . that allure should
prompt us to remain alert to constitutionalconcerns, lest we gradually
recreate through machines instead of magistrates the civil law mode of
ex parte production of evidence that constituted the principal evil at
which the ConfrontationClause was directed."'"
I. INTRODUCTION

Trial by machine is here. 2 Where once an analyst testified in
court based on tests conducted by hand, now a sophisticated machine
completes the analysis that incriminates the defendant. 3 That is not
inherently bad. But the defendant would have been guaranteed a right
to cross-examine his human analyst; what rights does the defendant
have for the surrogate machine? Because the machine cannot be
cross-examined, most courts have concluded that this machine accuser
is outside the reach of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

1.
People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 494 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004)).
2.
Hat tip to Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245 (2016), for this excellent
phrasing.
3.
See infra Part II; see also United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 1977);
Roth, supra note 2, at 1247 (citing Bursten, 560 F.2d at 785).
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Amendment's guarantee that "the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
be confronted with the witnesses against him."4 For some courts, it

does not matter how human-like the machine acts; even when the
machine-generated accusation contains the signature of a human and
an oath under penalty of perjury," it remains beyond the reach of
hearsay and Confrontation Clause principles. 5 The result is a growing
realm of testimonial evidence that accuses without judicial
accountability. 6
The rules of evidence could help protect defendants' rights in
this realm, but many courts have surrendered their gatekeeping role
for machine accusers and are not enforcing evidentiary rules.7 Perhaps
most egregious, courts commonly require no testimony from the only
person who knows if the test that produced the accusation at issue was
run properly-the analyst who operated the forensic machine. Instead,
they accept the testimony of the analyst's supervisors who, on the basis
of the machine-generated data, testify to results from tests they never
witnessed.8 As machine accusers increasingly replace human
witnesses, 9 the right to cross-examine and confront one's accuser is
declining conversely.
Like any tool, "machine accusers" are both fallible and
susceptible to human influence. Machines already serve as witnesses
against criminal defendants in innumerable contexts: they describe
crime scenes;IO they identify people via facial recognition programs 1

4.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th
Cir. 2007).
5.
See, e.g., BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 313 (4th
Cir. 2018) (copyright infringement notices were generated by machine and thus were not hearsay).
6.
Cf. State v. Salamone, No. 1 CA-CR 16-0204, 2017 WL 2875096, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App.
July 6, 2017) ("Although the chromatograms are certainly evidence against Salamone, as
exclusively-machine-generated data they are not out-of-court statements by any person, and thus
are not subject to confrontation or hearsay analysis.").
7.
See, e.g., Brian Sites, Machines Ascendant: Robots and the Rules of Evidence, 3 GEO.
L. TECH. REV. 1 (2018).
8.
See, e.g., id. at 7.
9.
Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1975 (2017) ("[T]he past
century has witnessed a noteworthy rise in the 'silent testimony' of instruments.") (quoting MIRJAN
R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 143 (1997)).

10.
Mauricio Marin, NLV Police Have New Crime-Solving Tool, LAS VEGAS Now
(June 23, 2017, 6:32 PM), http://www.lasvegasnow.com/news/nlv-police-have-new-crime-solvingtool/749450915 [https://perma.cc/MT56-GK6P].
11.
See,
e.g.,
Natasha
Singer,
Never Forgetting a Face, N.Y.
TIMES
(May 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/technology/never-forgetting-a-face.html
[https://perma.cc/UCZ3-AHIV] (noting use of facial recognition in law enforcement in New York,
Pennsylvania, and California, and also by casinos, grocery stores, and others); Andrew Flanagan,
Thanks to Al, a 3rd Person Is Arrested Following a Pop Superstar's Concert, NPR (May 23, 2018,
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and other biometric recognition tools; 12 they state where people were by
locating phones; 13 they identify vehicles via license plate readers;1 4
they analyze and report crimes via drug, firearm, and general
crime-detecting devices; 15 they provide opinions in sentencing and
parole decisions; 16 and they provide expert analysis on a variety of
topics ranging from DNA to drugs via forensic laboratory machines.1 7
Some machine accusers replace human witnesses; others offer
testimony that humans could not offer themselves.1 8
4:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/therecord/2018/05/23/613692526/thanks-to-ai-a-3rd-person-is-arrested-following-a-pop-superstars-concert
[https://perma.cc/Y94Y-EJXQ]
(describing
facial recognition software's use in China and noting that "Amazon has been shopping its own
facial recognition technology . . . to U.S. law enforcement").
12.
See, e.g., Street-Level Surveillance: Tattoo Recognition, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov.
30, 2017), https://www.eff.org/pages/tattoo-recognition [https://perma.cc/UV54-EW69] (describing
the tattoo-recognition technology as "still in its infancy, [but] ... being actively developed by
private companies with the support of federal agencies, state law enforcement, and universities").
13.
See, e.g., Tom Jackman, Police Use of 'StingRay'Cellphone Tracker Requires Search
Warrant, Appeals Court Rules, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/09/21/police-use-of-stingray-cellphone-tracker-requiressearch-warrant-appeals-court-rules/ [https://perma.cc/XMQ4-Z4EA] (discussing StingRay usage
as widespread).
14.
See, e.g., Josh Shannon, Newark PoliceExpanding Network ofAutomatic License Plate
Readers, NEWARK POST (Mar. 14, 2018), http://www.newarkpostonline.com/news/newark-policeexpanding-network-of-automatic-license-plate-readers/article cb2b9a42-4efc-50ce-ba497822c8e89877.html [https://perma.cc/58AT-2MK7].
15.
See, e.g., Future Attribute Screening Technology Fact Sheet, DEP'T HOMELAND
SEC. (July 31, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/future-attribute-screening-technology
[https://perma.cc/R2RB-WUUC]; Lexy Savvides, Crime-Fighting Robot Can Detect Weapons
in a Crowd, CNET (Sept. 21, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/knightscope-securityrobot-can-detect-weapons-in-a-crowd
[https://perma.cc/D6AK-K5M8];
Sharon
Weinberger,
Terrorist 'Pre-Crime' Detector Field Tested in United States, NATURE (May 27, 2011),
https://www.nature.com/news/2011/110527/full/news.2011.323.html
[https://perma.cc/LYT7U94W]; Chris Weller, There's a Secret Technology in 90 US Cities that Listens for Gunfire 24/7,
BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2017, 10:59 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-shotspotter-worksmicrophones-detecting-gunshots-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/9CJ5-Q87J].
16.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW,
SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 101-14 (2007)

(discussing future dangerousness); see generally Brian Sites, The Danger of FutureDangerousness
in Death Penalty Use, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 963-65 (2007) (discussing future dangerousness
analyses).
17.
See generally Brian Sites, Rise of the Machines: Machine-Generated Data and the
Confrontation Clause, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 36, 51-57 (2014) (describing cases and
various forensic tools in the context of the Confrontation Clause).
18.
See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Defense Attorneys Demand Closer Look at Software Used to
Detect Crime-Scene DNA, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2015, 5:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/defense-attorneys-demand-closer-look-at-software-used-to-detect-crime-scene-dna- 1447842603
[https://perma.cc/Y45G-5FC9] (discussing TrueAllele, "a program that untangles DNA when
humans can't" and citing as an example "a recent Commerce Department study of more than 100
crime labs around the country, [which found that] only seven of them were able to correctly
untangle a complex DNA mixture"); see also Jessica Pishko, The Impenetrable Program
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These issues grow in importance as true artificial intelligence
(AI) inches toward reality. Even in the interim, however, this threat is
not abated by the "dumb" nature of today's merely semiautonomous
machines. As noted above, non-Al machines routinely provide
statements against criminal defendants now. They have been doing so
for years. Courts have largely failed to recognize this threat and adopt
suitable rights for criminal defendants. Machines become increasingly
autonomous each week, and with the power of many of today's
algorithmic predictions, it is no stretch to say that "nearly artificially
intelligent" machines are already on the scene.
How, then, should society and the courts respond? In a world
where machines increasingly assume the "accuser" roles previously
filled by human agents, what rights should a criminal defendant have?
Any expansion of the Confrontation Clause's protection will come at a
price paid by the criminal justice system and society at large.1 9 But the
absence of that protection increases the risk of false positives (wrongful
convictions), and it does so against a backdrop of innumerable
laboratory scandals involving errors, sample contamination, faked test
results, and outright fraud. 20 In that balancing, if an acceptable center
position cannot be found, the rights of criminal defendants and the
integrity of the criminal justice system must win out.
In two earlier articles, I discussed how existing Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence and the rules of evidence apply to machine
accusers. 21 This Article argues that the Confrontation Clause right
must evolve beyond existing interpretations in response to machine
accusers. Part II highlights important portions of the history of the
Confrontation Clause, including a brief foray into recent jurisprudence.
Part III then highlights the current machine-generated evidence
jurisprudence across the nation. Finally, Part IV considers how the
Confrontation Clause should respond to the rise of new technologies.

Transforming how Courts Treat DNA
Evidence, WIRED (Nov. 29,
2017, 7:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/trueallele-software-transforming-how-courts-treat-dna-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/5H2W-QKRW] (describing TrueAllele as a program that can "make connections that elude humans").
19.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 542 (Pa. 2013) (concluding that a
system using fewer analysts would cause more errors than an assembly line process); Jennifer
Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the ConfrontationClause, 2012
SUP. CT. REV. 99, 154 (2013) ("[D]raconian Confrontation Clause rules might well motivate
laboratories to make . . . modifications [such as reducing the number of analysts]. But if these
modifications took laboratories in directions inconsistent with the practices of science more
generally, it is far from clear that these would be positive developments.").
20.
See sources cited infra, notes 122-25 (citing examples of lab scandals).
21.
Sites, supra note 7 (discussing this issue under the rules of evidence); Sites, supranote
17 (discussing existing Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
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This Article advocates for restoring the Confrontation Clause to the
important role it had before the rise of machine-generated witnesses.
Supplemental solutions, such as the rules of evidence, are also
discussed.
II. THE ROAD TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Compared to the robust history surrounding many other
important rights, little is known about the origin of the Confrontation
Clause. As Justice Haran phrased it, "The Confrontation Clause comes
to us on faded parchment." 22 The lack of information surrounding the
Clause's adoption makes determining its application to machine
accusers (and other witnesses against the accused) challenging. That
difficulty is exacerbated by confusion about other, related rights,
including the "continuing confusion about the very nature of the law of
evidence at the end of the eighteenth century." 23
A. The Right to Confrontation:An Abbreviated Origin Story
Although parts of the modern Clause's history are unclear, the
right to confront one's accusers is of ancient lineage. There are
indications that a right of confrontation existed at least as early as
under Roman law. 2 4 It may have existed in England before even the
right to jury trial. 2 5 Many of the terms of the modern Confrontation
Clause retain substantially the same meaning now as they had in 1791.
For example, "witness" meant, both then and now, "one who gives
testimony or who testifies, i.e., in judicial proceedings, one who makes
a solemn declaration under oath, for the purpose of establishing or
making proof of some fact to a court." 2 6

22.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("History
seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause."); see Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination:Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent,
and 'at Risk', 14 WIDENER L. REV. 429, 430 n. 7 (2009) (collecting sources and noting "the lack of
contemporaneous documentation of the Framers' motivations and intentions regarding [the
Confrontation Clause]").
23.
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 248 (2003).
24.
See, e.g., Acts 25:16 (The Roman Governor Festus stated, "It is not the manner of the
Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face,
and have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him."); Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988) (quoting Acts 25: 16 for this same point).
25.
See, e.g., Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation:Its History and Modern Dress,
8 J. PUB. L. 381, 384-87 (1959); Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016 (making this same observation).
26.
Marylandv. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
and modification marks omitted) (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (citing JAMES BUCHANAN, LINGUAE BRITANNICAE VERA PRONUNCIATIO
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Although courts now place great emphasis on the right to be in
the physical presence of one's accuser, early forms of the confrontation
right seem to have prioritized the cross-examination aspect of the right.
For example, Wigmore concluded that common law did not recognize
an "indispensable thing called confrontation as distinguished from
cross-examination."27 Although there was a right to cross-examination,
and it was viewed as indispensable, "that right was involved in and
secured by confrontation; it was the same right under different
names." 28 Beyond this, the Clause's history provides little guidance
regarding the proper application to machine accusers.
Some important details, however, are clear; the simplest of these
start with the text. The Confrontation Clause states that "[i]n all
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." 2 9 It applies in both state
criminal prosecutions,

and federal prosecutions. 30 Its text IS susceptible to multiple
interpretations, including that the Clause embraces "those who actually
testify at trial, those whose statements are offered at trial, or something
in-between." 31 Importantly, it is presented as a strong right-it applies
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions." 32 The Confrontation Clause guarantees
the opportunity for effective cross-examination, but it does not
guarantee that the opportunity will bear fruit and actually be
effective. 33 As the US Supreme Court noted in 1895:
The primary object of [the Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex
parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against

the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness,
in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief.34

(1757)). As Justice Scalia noted, the quoted text has a second meaning of "witness," but it is a
meaning inapplicable in this context given the Confrontation Clause's phrasing, "witnesses
against [the defendant]." Id. at 864-65.
27.
5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1397 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (emphasis in original).
28.
Id.
29.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965); see also Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 42 (2004) (citing Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43 (citations omitted).
31.
32.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988); 2 DAVID LAURENCE FAIGMAN,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

§

14:1.3 (2002).

34.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (quoted in California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 157-58).
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For those reasons, unconfronted witnesses, unsworn witnesses, and
testimony by affidavits were recognized as especially problematic. 35
B. Modern Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence
The best known influence on the origins of the modern
Confrontation Clause is the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason in
1603, and his experience served as a central framework for the Court's
modern jurisprudence. 36 Sir Raleigh's accuser, an alleged accomplice,
had implicated him through out-of-court statements that were repeated
against Sir Raleigh at trial. 37 Sir Raleigh pleaded to have his accuser
brought "before [his] face" but to no avail; Sir Raleigh was subsequently
convicted, sentenced to death, and eventually executed. 38
In recent decades, the Court has issued numerous Confrontation
Clause decisions. Perhaps the most important of them is Crawford v.
Washington, because in it the Court essentially rewrote the governing
Confrontation Clause standard. 39 In Crawford, a husband stabbed a
man and claimed self-defense, but the wife's recounting of the event to
police was arguably inconsistent with a self-defense theory. 40 The wife
refused to testify, asserting a state marital privilege, so the state
introduced her prior out-of-court statement. 1 The Court held that
admitting the statement violated the husband's Confrontation Clause
right. 42
In so holding, the Court rewrote the prior standard, 43 which
focused on hearsay law and the reliability of the evidence.44 The Court
concluded in Crawford that this approach failed to adequately address
the core concerns of the Confrontation Clause: "Where testimonial
statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave
the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 'reliability."'

35.

See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

§

1786 (1833)

(discussing risks of false testimony).
See Roger W. Kirst, The ProceduralDimensions of ConfrontationDoctrine, 66 NEB. L.
36.
REV. 485, 490 (1987).
37.
See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
40.
Id. at 38-39.
41.
Id. at 40.
42.
See id. at 68.
43.
See id. at 60-68 (citing the prior test, established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980)).
44.
See id. at 62-67.
45.
Id. at 51, 61.
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Instead, the Court concluded that while the Confrontation
Clause serves as a shield against the admission of unreliable testimony,
it does so as "a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.
It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability
be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible
of cross-examination."4 6 In sum, "[w]here testimonial evidence is
at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the common
law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for
4 7
cross-examination."

In Davis v. Washington, the Court elaborated on what
"testimonial" means.4 8 Davis involved two consolidated cases. In the
first case, a woman called 911 to report an ongoing emergency. In the
second case, police officers responded to an alleged act of domestic abuse
that had already occurred.4 9 At trial, the prosecution sought to
introduce the 911 call in the former case and the victim's statements
collected by the police at the scene in the latter.5 0 The Court reiterated
that only testimonial statements trigger the Confrontation Clause and
explained that statements are testimonial when "the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution."5 1 The Davis Court held that the
statements made during an ongoing emergency were not testimonial;
they were statements intended to help resolve that emergency rather
than just to learn about a potential past crime, and they were part of
an exchange that was not formal. 52 However, in the second case, the
Court found that the victim's statements were testimonial because they
were made in the context of an investigation into alleged criminal
conduct, were not casual remarks but instead somewhat formal
statements to government officials, and "the primary, if not indeed the
sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime." 53

In short, the statements "d[id] precisely what a witness does on direct
examination."54

46.
Id. at 61.
47.
Id. at 68 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Richard D. Friedman,
Confrontationand Forensic LaboratoryReports, Round Four, 45 TEx. TECH L. REV. 51, 57 (2012).
48.
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
49.
See id. at 818.
50.
See id.
51.
Id. at 821-22; see also Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 1157 (2011).
52.
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (discussing each of these factors).
53.
Id. at 829-30.
54.
Id. at 830 (emphasis in original).
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A case decided in 2011 provided additional clarity as to the
meaning of "testimonial," Michigan v. Bryant.5 5 In Bryant, the victim
was shot outside a home and drove to a gas station where police found
him mortally wounded.5 6 The officers asked the victim "what had
happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred."5 7
The victim answered and died shortly afterwards. The prosecution tried
to introduce these answers at trial by asking the officers who spoke with
him. 5 8

The

Court

concluded

that

these

statements

were

not

testimonial.5 9 Instead, they were statements made to resolve an
ongoing emergency-the victim's shooter still being at large.6 0 The
Confrontation Clause analysis, the Court held, required an objective
evaluation of the circumstances in which the statements were
made. 6 1 That objective analysis looks at both the declarant and the
interrogator: "[T]he relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual
purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather
the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as
ascertained from the individuals' statements and actions and the
circumstances in which the encounter occurred." 62 Finally, the Court
reiterated that the analysis includes consideration of whether "state
actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness
to obtain evidence for trial."63

The Court has also addressed whether forensic evidence is
testimonial. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court considered a
case involving three "certificates of analysis" that stated the results of
forensic tests performed on certain seized substances.6 4 Those
documents contained various details, including the date the bags were
analyzed, an identification number, the name of the officer who
submitted the bags, a certification by the analysts that the substance
was found to contain cocaine, the weight of the samples, the defendant's
name, the analysts' signatures, and a notarization. 65 The analysts who
55.
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 361.
56.
See id. at 348-49.
Id. at 349.
57.
58.
See id. at 350.
59.
See id. at 378.
60.
See id.
61.
See id. at 359.
62.
See id. at 360.
63.
See id. at 358.
64.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307-08 (2009).
65.
Appendix A, Memorandum and Order Pursuant to Rule 1:28 at 24a-29a,
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 921 N.E.2d 108 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (No. 05-P-1213),
available
at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/07-591_ob.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6ZA-GNZS] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
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signed the reports did not testify at trial, despite the defendant's
objection under the Confrontation Clause. 66
The Court held that the lab reports were "within the core class
of testimonial statements" under Crawford and Davis. 67 The Court first
noted that they were "functionally identical to live, in-court testimony,
doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination."' 68 Writing
for the Court, Justice Scalia explained:
[N]ot only were the affidavits "made under circumstances which would lead an

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use
at a later trial," but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was
to prove prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the
analyzed substance. 69

Thus, the affidavits were the analysts' testimonial statements, and the
analysts who prepared them were witnesses for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment. 70 Melendez-Diaz is thus highly relevant to machine
accusers, but because the case centered on the analysts' formal
confirmation of the lab results, it does not address the core question of
machine-generated accusations and the role of testimony from lab
analysts who operate them (but who did not certify the results of the
test or the analysis the machine conducted).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico took the Court one step closer to
addressing machine accusers but ultimately did not resolve that issue.7 1
The prosecution charged the defendant in that case with driving while
intoxicated and submitted the defendant's blood sample for analysis. 72
The resulting report listed the defendant's blood-alcohol content (BAC)
as determined via a forensic lab machine (a gas chromatograph),
certified that the analyst received the sample with the seal unbroken,
affirmed that the analyst followed lab procedures listed on the back of
the report, and certified the analyst's findings. 73 The supervising lab
employee certified that the analyst was qualified to conduct the BAC
test and that the "established procedure" for handling and analyzing
the sample had been followed.7 4 Finally, the report identified the
analyst who conducted the test, the date and time the sample was

66.
67.
68.
69.

See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309.
See id. at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 310-11 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
See id. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crawford v. Washington,

541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).

70.

See id.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661, 673-74 (2011).
See id. at 652.
See id. at 653-54.
See id. at 653.
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drawn, and the reason for the defendant's detention ("Accident"), and it
contained certifications from the nurse and officer as to the blood drawn
and chain-of-custody information.7 5
At trial, the prosecution did not call the analyst who conducted
the analysis to testify because the analyst had, for reasons unstated,
recently been placed on unpaid leave.7 6 Instead, the prosecutor called a
different analyst and introduced the BAC report through that surrogate
witness.7 7 The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the on-leave
analyst who prepared the report "was a mere scrivener" who "simply
transcribed the results generated by the gas chromatograph
machine."78 That court further explained that the "true 'accuser' was

the gas chromatograph machine"7 9 and noted that the substitute
analyst who testified in court could be cross-examined about the
machine, the lab's procedures, and the BAC results.8 0 Thus, the New
Mexico court held that a machine had testified, but the Confrontation
Clause was not violated.
The US Supreme Court disagreed. The primary holding in
Bullcoming was that the analyst certified more than the BAC data: the
analyst also certified, via the report, that he received the defendant's
sample intact and sealed, that he performed a specific test by following
lab protocols, and that there were no anomalies in that process that
might have "affect[ed] the integrity of the sample or ... the validity of
the analysis."8 1 The Court also concluded that the prosecution could not

enter the testimonial report through the substitute testimony of
another analyst that was familiar with the process. 82
Justice Sotomayor provided the fifth vote in Bullcoming, but she
did so with reservations. In her concurrence, she highlighted that
Bullcoming did not present the question of whether one expert could
offer his or her opinion in court based on underlying testimonial records
that were not themselves admitted. 83 Justice Sotomayor also noted that
the

Court "[did] not decide

whether ...

a State could introduce

(assuming an adequate chain of custody foundation) raw data
generated by a machine in conjunction with the testimony of an expert

75.
See id.
76.
See id. at 655.
77.
See id.
78.
State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8-9 (N.M. 2010).
79.
Id. at 9.
80.
Id.
81.
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 659-60 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting the lab procedures).
82.
See id. at 661.
83.
See id. at 673 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
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witness."8 4 Thus, on the pivotal question of machine accusers, the path
ahead for the Clause remains uncharted.
C. Related Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence
Finally, four other cases warrant mention.8 5 In Ohio v. Clark,
the Court held that statements of a three-year-old child to his teachers
about marks on his body were not testimonial.8 6 The majority concluded
that "[i]n the end, the question is whether, in light of all the
circumstances, viewed objectively, the 'primary purpose' of the
conversation was to 'creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony."' 8 7 The Court held that the young child's statements-made
to a teacher in a lunchroom and then in a classroom, and made in the
context of the ongoing emergency of suspected child abuse-were not
made with that primary purpose.8 8 In reaching that conclusion, the
Court noted that
[c]ourts must evaluate challenged statements in context, and part of that context is
the questioner's identity. Statements made to someone who is not principally
charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less
likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers. . . .We do
89
not ignore that reality.

As discussed further in Part IV, just as the context and questioner's
identity were important in Clark, they are important when machine
accusers-for example, forensic machines creating statements with the
purpose of investigating crimes-provide testimony.
In a second case, Giles v. California, the Court addressed the
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.9 0 The Court ultimately held that
the doctrine could exempt statements from the Confrontation Clause,
but that to do so the defendant must have made the declarant
unavailable for the purpose of avoiding the declarant's testimony at

84.

Id. at 674.

85.
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality opinion), offers little help to the
modern analysis. Williams was a fractured decision that is deeply inconsistent with the Court's
prior cases. Justice Thomas, concurring in result only and providing the fifth vote, recognized
this: he rejected the plurality's reasoning in full and, under his own test, concluded that the results
were not sufficiently formal and thus did not trigger the Confrontation Clause. The four dissenting
justices agreed with Justice Thomas that the plurality's test was flawed analytically and a
departure from the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, but they also rejected Justice
Thomas's formality test.
86.
See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2176 (2015).
Id. at 2180 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358).
87.
See id. at 2181.
88.
Id. at 2182.
89.
90.
See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008).
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trial.9 1 The Court reached that outcome over a strong dissent, and in
responding to that dissent, Justice Scalia noted that "the guarantee of
confrontation is no guarantee at all if it is subject to whatever
exceptions courts from time to time consider 'fair."' 92 Justice Scalia's
concern over maligning the Clause's analysis with exceptions illustrates
one risk also posed by categorically exempting machine accusers from
the right of confrontation.
Finally, in two pre-Crawford cases that are still generally
applicable, 93 the Court considered the Confrontation Clause's
face-to-face confrontation right. Because testifying can be potentially
traumatizing for children, especially when it includes having to "face"
the child's alleged tormenter, courts have employed various tools to
protect the defendant's confrontation right while mitigating the stress
for the child witness. In one such case, Coy v. Iowa, the Court considered
whether a screen separating the child witnesses from the defendant
violated the Confrontation Clause.94 The screen "enable[d] the
[defendant] to dimly perceive the witnesses, but the witnesses to see
him not at all." 95 The Court held it was unconstitutional, 96 concluding

that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of
the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter."9 7
In characterizing the legal error at hand, the Court contrasted
it with other Confrontation Clause rights that were merely "reasonably
implicit" in the Clause-"namely, the right to cross-examine; the right
to exclude out-of-court statements; and the asserted right to face-to-face
confrontation at some point in the proceedings other than the trial
itself."9 8 Thus, not only did the Court find the right of face-to-face
confrontation essential, it elevated it potentially above other lofty rights
such as the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Additionally, the Court noted that it was conceivable a right to
confrontation error was harmless, but the Court cautioned on how to
conduct such an analysis: "An assessment of harmlessness cannot
include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have
been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been
confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure
91.
See id at 354.
92.
Id. at 375.
93.
See, e.g., FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at § 16:10 ("Indeed, lower courts have held
that Crawford did not affect the continuing validity of the rule set forth in [Maryland u.] Craig.").
94.
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988).
Id. at 1015.
95.
See id. at 1021-22.
96.
Id. at 1020.
97.
98.
Id. (citation omitted).
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speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the
basis of the remaining evidence."9 9 This holding proves important to the
machine-accuser analysis because, where the defendant has had no
opportunity to confront the analyst who actually operated the machine,
any harmless error analysis would similarly be ill-advised to focus
on-i.e., speculate about-how that analyst might have testified.
Justice O'Connor and Justice White provided the fifth and sixth
votes in Coy, but Justice O'Connor also wrote separately. 100 She noted
that, though the screen used in Coy was problematic, it was one of
multiple ways to shield witnesses from courtroom trauma, and the
Court was not addressing those other options. 10 1 One such alternative
she mentioned was videotaped testimony. 102 She also emphasized that
the right to confront, while at the core of the Clause, was not absolute,
and it should bend when balanced against other important public
policy-based rationales. 10 3
Justice O'Connor's balancing test won the day in the Court's
subsequent case, Maryland v. Craig.104 Craiginvolved the testimony of
a six-year-old via one-way closed-circuit television through which the
child, prosecutor, and defense counsel were in one room (where the child
delivered testimony), and video of that room was relayed to the
courtroom where the defendant, judge, and jury remained. 105 The Court
held that the procedure did not violate the Clause because "[t]he central
concern of the Confrontation Clause" was "to ensure the reliability of
the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous
testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of
fact," and this method accomplished that objective. 106
Notably, to use such modifications to face-to-face confrontation,
the trial court must find that the modification "is necessary to further
an important public policy and only where the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured."1 0 7 If such a finding is needed to merely
modify the right to confront in a child-accuser case, the outright denial
of the confrontation right in machine-accuser cases would seem to at
least mandate a similar result. But courts have generally made no such
findings in denying defendants the right to confront the operators of

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1021-22.
See id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 1022-23.
See id. at 1023.
See id. at 1024-25.
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 836 (1990).
See id. at 840-43.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 850.
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machines used to generate accusations. Thus, although the four cases
discussed in this Section do not expressly chart the path for machine
accusers under the Confrontation Clause, they point toward a common
destination: the categorial exemption of machine accusers from the
Confrontation Clause is problematic.
III. MACHINE-ACCUSER IMMUNITY UNDER THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Against this backdrop of Supreme Court jurisprudence, federal
and state courts have wrestled with how to protect criminal defendants
in an era of machine accusers. In that battle, machine accusers have
repeatedly triumphed. This doctrine has come to be called the
"machine-generated testimony doctrine."10 8 The consensus from courts
in at least four circuits and numerous states is that machine-generated
data-absent separate certifications from lab analysts-do not trigger
the Confrontation Clause because it is the machines, not the analysts
operating them, that make the statements at issue. 109 This leads to
multiple problems. First, since the machine operator is not seen as
making any statement in connection with the machine's results, the
defendant has no right under the Clause to confront the operator, even
though the operator is often the only person in the world who knows
whether the machine was used properly. Second, because the machine's
statement is treated as outside the scope of the Clause, a critical
constitutional right inches toward extinction as machine accusers
increasingly replace human witnesses.
The result is a persistent trend of courts admitting expert
testimony about results from tests that the testifying expert never ran,
never witnessed being run, and often has no ability to even confirm
actually derive from the laboratory sample. As described in the next
Part, that problematic result is arguably correct under current
Confrontation Clause principles. Because the rules of evidence do not

108.

See Sites, supra note 17; text accompanying notes 89-117; see also Peter Nicolas, But

What if the Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right to Confront Hidden Declarants Found in
Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1192-93 (2010) (noting, while
addressing a different issue, that "the Confrontation Clause encompasses only statements by
people").
109.
Four circuits have held that machine-generated data are not hearsay and do not
trigger the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., UnitedStatesv. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789 F.3d 1107, 1110
(9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 321 (4th
Cir. 2007). Other circuits have intimated they might agree. See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Akron,
619 F. App'x 462, 479-480 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th
Cir. 2005).
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offer a sufficient basis for protection against the risks posed by machine
accusers, 110 Confrontation Clause jurisprudence must evolve to fill the
gap forming with the rise of machine witnesses. Reserving for Part IV
the question of how it must evolve,1 11 this Part briefly reiterates the
history leading to the current state of machine-witness immunity.
A. Machine Accusers Arrive: United States v. Washington
The best known example of the machine-generated testimony
doctrine is the case that effectively created it: United States v.
Washington.112 In Washington, a police officer pulled over an individual
for erratic driving and obtained a blood sample. 113 After forensic
analysis, and based on approximately twenty pages of data printed by
a forensic machine, the lab director concluded that the blood sample
contained intoxicants. 114 The lab director, however, had not run,
assisted with, or otherwise observed any of the tests producing the
underlying data. Further, the three analysts who did so-i.e., the only
people who actually used the machines in connection with the
defendant's sample-did not testify in court. Instead, their supervisor
did.115
At trial, the defendant claimed a right to cross-examine the
three analysts pursuant to the Confrontation Clause.11 6 The trial court
disagreed.11 7 On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed 18 and concluded that the defendant had no such right under
the Confrontation Clause because "the inculpating 'statement'-that
[the defendant]'s blood sample contained PCP and alcohol-was made
by the machine .

. .

. [and thus was not subject to] the Confrontation

Clause."1 19 Thus was born the doctrine of machine-accuser immunity.

110.
See infra Part IV; see also Sites, supra note 7.
111.
See infra Part IV.
112.
See Washington, 498 F.3d at 321. Though other cases preceded Washington, in the
post-Crawfordworld, Washington functions as the first test to adopt this analysis. See, e.g., Joe
Bourne, Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: When Is a Lab Report Testimonial?, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1058, 1079-80 (2009) (describing Washington as "an analytical angle from which no
other court had approached a Crawford issue pertaining to forensic science").
113.
See Washington, 498 F.3d at 227-28.
114.
See id. at 228.
115.
See id.
116.
See id. at 229.
117.
See id.
See id. at 232.
118.
119.
Id. at 230.
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Suppose, despite their best intentions and efforts, the three
analysts in Washington had not used the lab equipment correctly. 120 Or
suppose, instead, that one of the analysts intentionally1 2 1 or
accidentallyl 22 altered the sample. With no ability to cross-examine the
analysts, how would the trial court ascertain these facts? It could not.
What if the analysts never actually ran the test at all and instead
falsified the results? 123 If the analysts in Washington were just another
example of the "major failures [that] have occurred in more than 100
U.S. labs" over the years, 124 the trial court's refusal to muster either the
rules of evidence or Confrontation Clause against them left the
defendant nearly powerless to safeguard his rights. "Just as human
sources potentially suffer the so-called 'hearsay dangers' of insincerity,
ambiguity, memory loss, and misperception, machine sources [immune
from confrontation] potentially suffer 'black box' dangers that could
lead a factfinder to draw the wrong inference from information

120.
See, e.g., Chuck Lindell, Court: Examine if Austin Crime Lab Botched Death
Penalty Evidence,
STATESMAN
(Sept.
22,
2018,
4:39
AM),
https://www.statesman.com/news/20171018/court-examine-if-austin-crime-lab-botched-death-penalty-evidence
[https://perma.cc/9JS5-CMWP].
121.
See, e.g., Rebecca Everett, Future Cloudy for Thousands of Drug Cases Tested by
Sonja Farak, Records Show Tampering Went On for Nearly Nine Years, DAILY HAMPSHIRE
GAZETTE (July 9, 2015), http://www.gazettenet.com/Archives/2015/07/druglabfolo-hg-070815
[https://perma.cc/7NP5-GU6W]; Roma Khanna & Steve MeVicker, Probe Finds Crime Lab Faked
Results in 4 Cases, HOUS. CHRONICLE (June 1, 2005, 5:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Probe-finds-crime-lab-faked-results-in-4-cases-1494739.php
[https://perma.cc/P24T-4XQ2].
122.
See, e.g., Tracey Kaplan, Crime Lab Uses Wrong Chemical in 2,500 Methamphetamine
Tests in Santa Clara County, MERCURY NEWS (May 5, 2014), https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/05/05/crime-lab-uses-wrong-chemical-in-2500-methamphetamine-tests-in-santaclara-county/ [https://perma.cc/6JXA-LH6S]; Allison Manning, Columbus Crime-Lab ErrorMight
Affect 38 Cases, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/08/08/lab-error-might-affect-38-cases.html [https://perma.cc/E9BB-BGV3].
123.
See, e.g., Katie Mettler, How a Lab Chemist Went from 'Superwoman' to Disgraced
Saboteur of More than 20,000 Drug Cases, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017, 4:23 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/04/21/how-a-lab-chemist-wentfrom-superwoman-to-disgraced-saboteur-of-more-than-20000-drug-cases/ [https://perma.cc/GJ7CLTYD] (describing a Massachusetts forensic analyst who falsified results by "not actually testing
all the drugs that came before her, forging her co-workers' initials and mixing drug samples so
that her shoddy analysis matched the results she gave prosecutors," leading to the dismissal of
21,587 drug cases "taintedby [her] misconduct"); Justin Zaremba, Lab Tech Allegedly FakedResult
in Drug Case; 7,827 Criminal Cases Now in Question, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2019),
http://www.nj.com/Passaic-county/index.ssf/2016/03/state-policelab-tech-allegedly faked resultsjin-p.html [https://perma.cc/FUS2-LWGS].
124.
Jordan Michael Smith, Forget CSL A DisasterIs Happeningin America's Crime Labs,
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/forensic-csi-crime-labs-disaster2014-4 [https://perma.cc/UDF7-F4KE]; see also Crime Lab and Forensic Scandals, KOMORN
L., http://komornlaw.com/crime-lab-and-forensic-scandals/ [https://perma.cc/KH87-SNPW] (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018) (listing numerous alleged forensic lab scandals).
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conveyed by a machine source." 125 In the world of machine-accuser
testimonial immunity, courts largely sacrifice sacrosanct rights of
criminal defendants in the name of lab convenience.
B. Machine Accusers Unite: Responses to Washington
Many courts have found Washington's rationale persuasive. 126
In United States v. Blazier, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
went so far as to state that "it is well-settled that under both the
Confrontation Clause and the rules of evidence, machine-generated
data and printouts are not statements and thus not hearsay-machines
are not declarants-and such data is therefore not 'testimonial."' 12 7 In
United States v. Moon, the Seventh Circuit endorsed Washington's
approach in a case involving raw data from an infrared spectrometer
and a gas chromatograph. 128 As in Washington, Moon involved one
expert testifying in court based on the raw data produced by a different
analyst. 129 The Seventh Circuit held that the conclusions the
nontestifying chemist came to were testimonial but the raw data from
the machines were not. 130 Thus, as in Washington, if the nontestifying
analyst had erred or committed fraud, the defendant had little ability
to demonstrate his innocence in the face of the machine accuser and its
surrogate witness-analyst.
Similarly, in United States v. Lamons, the Eleventh Circuit
cited both Washington and Moon approvingly, holding that data
produced by a machine memorializing telephone calls made were not
testimonial because "the witnesses with whom the Confrontation
Clause is concerned are human witnesses." 131 In United States v.
Lizarraga-Tirado,the Eleventh Circuit reached an analogous result in
a case involving a defendant arrested for illegally crossing the
125.
Roth, supra note 9, at 1977 (internal footnotes and citations omitted). But see Stephen
A. Saltzburg, Equipment, Hearsay, and Authentication, 22 CRIM. JUST. 38, 41 (2008) (arguing the
absence of Confrontation Clause or hearsay problems and that authentication is sufficient on bases
other than actual testing of analysts' testimony).
126.
See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, No. PWG-13-0251, 2014 WL 2919792, *6 (D. Md.
June 26, 2014) ("[A] machine cannot bear witness against an accused within the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause. [O]nly a human may be a declarant."). But see United States v.
Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2011) (concluding, without analyzing the
machine-generated testimony doctrine, that the testimony of one analyst about, inter alia, the
results of a test violated the Confrontation Clause).
127.
United States v. Blazier, 69 M.J. 218, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
128.
United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 360-62 (7th Cir. 2008).
129.
Id. at 360-61.
130.
Id. at 361.
United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1260-61, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in
131.
original).
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US-Mexico border. The case turned in part on whether he was arrested
in the United States or Mexico. 132 Important evidence on that point was
provided in the form of the government agents' assertion that they
"contemporaneously recorded the coordinates of defendant's arrest
using a handheld GPS device." 133 In assessing that claim, the court held
the evidence (the coordinates, etc.) was generated by a machine (Google
Earth), and, thus, it could not be hearsay because it was not a statement
by a person. 134
The list of such cases goes on, 135 and on, 136 and on, 137 both in
state courts 1 38 and federal courts. 139 Courts have reached analogous
conclusions for DNA results, 140 breathalyzer results,14 1 urinalysis

132.
United States v. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789 F.3d 1107, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015).
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 1109-10 (citing United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007)
and several other cases discussed herein).
135.
State v. Buckland, 96 A.3d 1163, 1172 (Conn. 2014) ("We hold that the machine
generated data is not subject to the restrictions imposed by Crawford, Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming.").
136.
See, e.g., Leger v. State, 732 S.E.2d 53, 60 (Ga. 2012) (supervisor may testify
about data generated by other analysts); People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. 2009)
("The ...

report,

furthermore,

was

not

'testimonial . . . because

it

consisted

of

merely

machine-generated graphs, charts and numerical data."); State v. Keck, No. 09CA50, 2011 WL
1233196, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2011) (no Confrontation Clause violation where one
analyst testified to her analysis, which was based in part on the apparently machine-generated
DNA results that another analyst produced); cf. State v. Ortiz-Zape, 743 S.E.2d 156, 162 (N.C.
2013) (citing Washington and Moon approvingly), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014); State v.
Dilboy, 48 A.3d 983, 989 (N.H. 2012) (noting that testimony based on "raw data, such as graphic
or numerical computer printouts . . . [might] not . . . violat[e] . . . the Confrontation Clause").

Hamilton v. State, 300 S.W.3d 14, 21-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (raw data produced by
137.
DNA analysis were machine-generated statements, and "[t]he Confrontation Clause implicates
statements made by persons, not machines").
People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 478 (Cal. 2012) ("Because, unlike a person, a
138.
machine cannot be cross-examined, here the prosecution's introduction into evidence of the
machine-generated printouts . . . did not implicate the Sixth Amendment's right to
confrontation.").
139.
United States v. Crockett, 586 F. Supp. 2d 877, 885 (E.D. Mich. 2008) ("[t]he
instrument readouts and printouts" resulting from analysis of cocaine did not implicate the
Confrontation Clause or hearsay rule); see also Adams v. United States, No. 09-6152 (GEB), 2011
WL 1792562, at *3-4 (D.N.J. May 10, 2011) (addressing, as an alternative basis for the court's
ruling, the merits of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas corpus claim that alleged error under the
Confrontation Clause, and citing as examples Washington and Moon).
140.
See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 244 P.3d 1163, 1166 (Ariz. 2010); People v. Arauz, 2d Crim.
No. B242843, 2013 WL 3357931, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3, 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2664
(2014).
141.
See Cranston v. State, 936 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); People v. Dinardo,
801 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010); Wimbishv. Commonwealth, 658 S.E.2d 715, 719-20 (Va.
Ct. App. 2008).
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results, 142 machine-generated data from equipment outside the lab, 143
and so on. Some courts reach this conclusion and expressly name the
machine-generated testimony rationale, like in the aforementioned
cases, while others reach it on more subtle grounds focusing on the
ability of supervisors to testify to what their supervisees analyzed.1 44
Washington is weathering the passage of time and intervening
US Supreme Court cases well; it was decided in 2007, before
Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams, and the petition for
certiorari was still pending when the Court issued Melendez-Diaz.14 5
Though the Court granted petitions for certiorari in other cases and
remanded them for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz, the
Supreme Court denied the petition in Washington.14 6 In the wake of
these various decisions, the Fourth Circuit has upheld Washington,14 7
and several courts have held that Washington's approach is still

142.
See Marshallv. People, 309 P.3d 943, 945-47 (Colo. 2013); United States v. Bradford,
2009 WL 4250093, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009); United States v. Anderson, 2009 WL
4250095, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009); United States v. Skrede, 2009 WL 4250031, at
*3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009).
143.
See, e.g., Stultz v. Artus, No. 04-CV-3170 (RRM), 2013 WL 937830, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 8, 2013) (automated message stating a payphone's phone number was a statement by a
machine, which falls outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause); cf Robertson v. Comonwealth,
738 S.E.2d 531, 532-33 (Va. Ct. App. 2013) (en banc) (involving, but not addressing as such,
machine-generated prices from a cash register).
144.
See Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 854-55 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam) (discussing this
issue and citing Washington and Moon approvingly); id. at 878-79 (Canady, J., concurring)
(disagreeing with the court's opinion on only other issues); Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157, 160
(Ga. 2009) (holding that a toxicologist could testify about tests and results obtained by another
doctor because the toxicologist "reviewed the data and testing procedures" and '[a]n expert may
base [his] opinions on data gathered by others") (second alteration in original) (citation omitted);
State v. Roach, 95 A.3d 683, 694-99 (N.J. 2014) (an analyst who tested one DNA sample may
testify about a DNA match based on results that depended, in part, on testing for a second DNA
sample that another analyst generated); Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 540 (Pa. 2013)
("[W]e hold that [the reviewing supervisor] is the analyst who determined Appellant's BAC.
Although he relied on the raw data produced by the lab technicians [who ran the machines] ... he
is the only individual who engaged in the critical comparative analysis of the results of
the . . . tests . . . and determined Appellant's BAC."); see also id. at 541-42 (collecting cases); cf
United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005) (computer-generated header
"was generated instantaneously by the computer without the assistance or input of a person," and
so, in the context of the hearsay rules, there was no "statement" or "declarant") (collecting cases).
145.
See United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 225 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 557
U.S. 934 (2009).
146.
See Washington v. United States, 557 U.S. 934 (2009) (denial of cert petition). This
does not mean that the Supreme Court necessarily approved of the result in Washington, as there
are many reasons a court of discretionary jurisdiction might deny review. The point only is that
the Court had an opportunity to address the doctrine post-Melendez-Diaz, or at least to require the
Fourth Circuit to reconsider in light of Melendez-Diaz, but declined to do so.
147.
See, e.g., United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 202-03 (4th Cir. 2011) (alleles were
machine-generated data; distinguishing Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz).
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sound.1 4 8 The votes are in, and it is a landslide: raw data are not
testimonial under the new post-Crawford line of cases, and machine
accusers remain largely immune to Confrontation Clause-based
challenges. 149

There is, however, a vocal dissent. 15 0 A scarce few have
recognized the dangers inherent in machine-accuser immunity and
enforced the Confrontation Clause's requirements.1 5 1 In Young v.
United States, the DC Circuit found a Confrontation Clause violation
where a supervisor gave surrogate testimony about DNA tests that she
neither conducted nor was present for. In doing so, the court
"emphasize[d] ... that it is too simplistic to say that the DNA profiles
and the [random-match probability] were not hearsay because they
were 'nothing more than the raw data produced by a machine."' 1 52 But
such results are few and far between.

148.
See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 656 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563-64 (E.D. Ma. 2009);
Hamilton v. State, 300 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App. 2009); United States v. Anderson, No. 2009-06,
2009 WL 4250095, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009); United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d
724, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2013); Oliver v. State, No. 14-09-00690-CR, 2010 WL 3307391, at *4 (Tex.
App. Aug. 24, 2010); United States v. Drayton, Criminal No. PWG-13-0251, 2014 WL 2919792, at
*8-9 (D. Md. June 26, 2014); People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 478 (Cal. 2012); People v. Revill, No.
B233987, 2013 WL 6094307, at *9-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2013).
149.
See, e.g., United States v. Bradford, Misc. Dkt. No. 2009-07, 2009 WL 4250093, at *5
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009) (not reported) ("A survey of the case law following the issuance
ofMelendez-Diaz reveals [that] the courts are focusing on the requirement that an expert testify
and that he or she do so using the data produced by the labs as the basis for his or her testimony.
The lab technicians were not required to be produced as witnesses."), reu'd on other grounds by 68
M.J. 371 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
150.
See, e.g., Washington, 498 F.3d at 232 (Michael, J., dissenting); State v. Roach, 95 A.3d
683, 698-701 (N.J. 2014) (Albin, J., dissenting); cf Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 711 (Ind.
2009) (Rucker, J., dissenting) (not addressing the machine-generated testimony doctrine but
stating, "despite whatever ambiguity Melendez-Diaz may have created on the question of
who must testify at trial, it appears to me the opinion is clear enough that a defendant has a
constitutional right to confront at the very least the analyst that actually conducts the tests").
151.
See, e.g., Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United
States v. Ramos-Gonz6lez, 664 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011) (concluding, without analyzing the
machine-generated testimony doctrine, that the testimony of one analyst about, inter alia, the
results of a test violated the Confrontation Clause); cf Martin v. State, 60 A.3d 1100, 1106
(Del. 2013) (lending some support to the right to cross-examine the operating analyst in
machine-generated data contexts).
152.
Young, 63 A.3d at 1046 (quoting Summers, 666 F.3d at 202). The DC Circuit went on
to state that
the [data at issue] do[es] not stand on [its] own but, instead, ha[s] meaning because [it]
amount[s] to a communication by the scientists who produced [it]-the assertion,
essentially, that the scientists generated these specific results by properly performing
certain tests and procedures on particular, uncorrupted evidence and correctly
recording the outcomes.
Id.
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IV. READYING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE FOR MACHINE ACCUSERS
The rise in semiautonomous machines is generally a boon to
society. Among other things, it enhances police protection and crime
prevention. The above cases, however, are troubling because they
illustrate that, as machine accusers arise, courts are permitting them
to erode constitutional rights crafted in a prior age. The baseline
position under the Confrontation Clause is a right of confrontation
when statements are made for use in a criminal trial. And yet, for
machine accusers, there is no right to confront the machine or the
machine operator.
Machine accusers should be viewed as falling within the core of
the Clause's concerns. For example, the Court has explained that "the
most important instances in which the Clause restricts the introduction
of out-of-court statements are those in which state actors are involved
in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence
for trial." 153 Machine-generated data from forensic labs consist, broadly,
of an analogous investigation, undertaken by an analyst outside the
presence of the defendant for the purpose of obtaining evidence for trial.
It should trigger some form of cross-examination or confrontation right
under the Clause. If it does not-if machines are an exception by
nature-that result is problematic. As Justice Scalia noted in Giles,
"[T]he guarantee of confrontation is no guarantee at all if it is subject
to whatever exceptions courts from time to time consider 'fair."' 154 As
described below, machines speak in a manner that is often testimonial,
and they should trigger the requirements of the Clause.
Support for a machine-accuser confrontation right permeates
the Court's decisions. For example, the Court noted in Ohio v. Clark
that "[c]ourts must evaluate challenged statements in context, and part
of that context is the questioner's identity." 15 5 The Court made a similar
observation in Bryant when it noted that the relevant inquiry looks at
both who is answering and who is asking the questions.1 56 Yet when a
forensic machine is used to make assertions in the context of a criminal
investigation-contexts in which the person "asking" the question
is doing so for a primary purpose that relates to a future or present
trial-the machine and its analyst are somehow immune to the Clause.
In this analysis, it is immaterial that machines act without their
own motivations and purposes. First, the Court has already noted that

153.
154.
155.
156.

Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011).
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008).
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015).
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 360.
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"the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the
individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose
that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the
individuals' statements and actions and the circumstances in which the
encounter occurred." 15 7 Just as a court ascribes a primary purpose to
"reasonable participants," it can ascribe a primary purpose to the
creation of machine accusations based on the myriad objective facts
surrounding the creation of such evidence.
Second, the Court defined testimony in this context as a "'solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact,' . . . a fact 'potentially relevant to later criminal

prosecution."' 158 Numerous machine accusations fit that bill, especially
those created in a forensic setting-an environment directed at formal
inquiries into, for example, criminal acts. Further, it is not difficult,
in most situations, to assess why the machine accusation was
generated-the machine did not have a purpose, but a purpose was
nevertheless present. In the case of nonautonomous machines, a human
agent activated, directed, or otherwise used the machine to create the
data. That operator had a purpose, and that purpose, as a guiding
element of the machine's activation, should control. When a police
officer directs a driver to use a breathalyzer, and the machine produces
a resulting statement of the driver's BAC, the purpose is usually
clear: to prove facts "potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."
If machine accusers trigger no right of confrontation as to their
statements or their analysts, it must be as an exclusion by category.
But no such exception is warranted simply because the accuser, a
machine (or as discussed below, a machine and human operator) is
different from a traditional accuser (a human agent). Other
constitutional rights do not balk in the face of machine actors. When
the government uses advanced technology to intrude into the privacy of
the home, for example, it is not rendered outside the protections of the
Fourth Amendment because of the machine's vital role-e.g., where it
perceived and translated the infrared spectrum. 15 9 If the government
had a series of drones patrolling an area in pursuit of a suspect, and one
errantly flew into a home and took pictures, this would still be a Fourth
Amendment violation-that it was a machine would not alter the
governmental intrusion into a private place without a warrant. So, too,

157.
Id.
158.
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
159.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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should accusations leveled at criminal defendants by machines trigger
a right of confrontation.
The Court described the purpose of the Confrontation Clause in
Crawford and Davis as grounded in the history of the common-law right
to confrontation, which was particularly concerned with the "use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused." 16 0 The Court made
that same observation at least as early as 1895 as well: "The primary
object of [the Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex
parte affidavits . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness." 161
That is what many machine-generated accusations are: evidence
against the accused generated by a machine in private, away from the
defendant's observation, that is then used against her at trial.
Ironically, when a court accepts such machine accusations without
empowering the defendant to cross-examine someone with firsthand
knowledge of the statement's creation, it only illustrates their ex parte
nature by further reducing the defendant's ability to test its accuracy,
legitimacy, and truth. Even if the defendant can submit the evidence to
testing to rival the prosecution's results-an option defendants
often will be unable to pursue because of resources and other
limitations-absent the ability to cross-examine the creator of the
prosecution's results, the defendant at best achieves a he-said-she-said
battle instead of what the Clause commands: a chance to confront his
accuser.
Machine accusers would also be subject to confrontation under
Justice Thomas's separate analytical model for the Clause. Justice
Thomas has repeatedly addressed whether the Confrontation Clause
applies by "assessing whether [the] statements bear sufficient indicia
of solemnity to qualify as testimonial." 162 The Court has not adopted
this test as a stand-alone analysis, but, ironically, many machine
accusations would meet even that requirement as well. Most machine
accusers are not creating evidence in a casual manner-they are
sophisticated tools built for the purpose of making formal declarations
about reality, such as whether DNA matches. The data generated by
forensic machines are rarely informal. They are often a calculated
determinations made in connection with a criminal investigation. In
those situations, they should be viewed as testimonial.
160.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (quoted in California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970)).
162.
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2186 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 836-37 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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A confrontation right in this area is consistent with the Court's
approach to the history and practice of the Confrontation Clause.
Statements by machine accusers are novel as to the roots of the Clause's
origin, but that should be no obstacle to recognizing a right to confront
machine accusers.
Defendants may invoke their Confrontation Clause rights once they have
established that the state seeks to introduce testimonial evidence against them in a
criminal case without unavailability of the witness and a previous opportunity to
cross-examine. The burden is upon the prosecutor who seeks to introduce evidence
over this bar to prove a long-establishedpractice of introducing specific kinds of
evidence, such as dying declarations for which cross-examination was not typically
necessary. 163

Of course, there is no long-established practice in the history of
the Clause's origins of recognizing machine-generated accusations as
outside the reach of confrontation. Thus, the Clause's default
position-a right of confrontation-controls. Further, the Court noted
in Crawford that "[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise
forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its
extinction." 164 The current jurisprudence on machine accusers does just
that; it has set the Clause down the green mile.
The first step forward is clear: the Clause must evolve. In
making the above comment about extinction, the Court cited Kyllo v.
United States, a Fourth Amendment case. There, the Court concluded
that the police's use of a thermal imaging device to replace or enhance
traditional human observation and investigation was an unlawful
search. 165 The Court did not "restrict" the Fourth Amendment's
protection to the "precise forms" of search that existed at the time of the
amendment's drafting. The Court recognized that constitutional rights
must evolve. Machines are increasingly built to do the testifying for
humans; forensic machines are one such example. Where once a
chemist would mix reagents and write a report, now machines conduct
the analysis and generate the statement. In other words, the machines
are creating reports that are the functional substitute for what an
expert witness would have done at trial. Such out-of-court testimony is
precisely what the Court in Crawford andDavis indicated would trigger
the Sixth Amendment right. In a world where society engineers
machine accusers to testify in place of human witnesses, it is natural
that the Confrontation Clause reach those replacement witnesses.1 66
163.
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2185 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
164.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 n.5.
165.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001).
166.
This Article does not suggest here that the intent in making forensic and other
machines that make assertions about reality is to escape the right of confrontation. That is,
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It bears repeating that criminal defendants need these
protections. Courts are simply incorrect in concluding that "[w]hether
the machines properly reported" on their tasked analyses is "dependent
solely on the machine . . . [and the] raw data generated by the
machines." 167 Most machine accusers do not act sua sponte. Machines
are vulnerable to manipulation, intentional or accidental, requiring the

following:
1. The technician operating the machine must use the machine
correctly, 168
2. The technician
sample, 169

must not intentionally tamper with the

3. The analyst must not accidentally alter the sample or err
otherwise, 170 and
4. The analyst must actually run the test instead of falsifying the
results.171
Decades of forensic lab scandals demonstrate that even if
machine accusers could operate independently, they cannot be assumed
to do so. The reality is that major errors have occurred in over one
hundred labs in the United States alone. 172 These same concerns can
arise in the programming of machines despite well-intended efforts to
avoid that. 173 And as another commentator summarized:

however, the outcome at hand, and criminal defendants should not pay the price of that valuable
innovation.
167.
United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007).
168.
See, e.g., Lindell, supra note 120.
169.
See, e.g., Everett, supra note 121; Seth Augenstein, Oregon State Crime Lab Analyst
Under Investigationfor Evidence Tampering, FORENSIC MAG. (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.forensiemag.com/article/20 15/09/oregon-state-crime-lab-analyst-under-investigation-evidence-tampering [https://perma.cc/K6PZ-P2DC]; Khanna & McVicker, supra note 121.
170.
See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 122; Manning, supra note 122.
171.
See, e.g., Mettler, supra note 123 (describing a Massachusetts forensic analyst who
falsified results by "not actually testing all the drugs that came before her, forging her co-workers'
initials and mixing drug samples so that her shoddy analysis matched the results she gave
prosecutors," leading to the dismissal of 21,587 drug cases "tainted by [her] misconduct");
Zaremba, supra note 123.
172.
Smith, supra note 124; see also Crime Lab and Forensic Scandals, supra note 124
(listing numerous alleged forensic lab scandals).
173.
See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Facebook 'Trending' List Skewed by Individual
Judgment, Not Institutional Bias, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/21/technology/facebook-trending-list-skewed-by-individual-judgment-not-institutional-bias.html [https://perma.cc/J2FB-MVP5]; David Murray, QueenslandAuthorities Confirm Miscode' Affects DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases, COURIER MAIL (Mar. 20, 2015),
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Just as human sources potentially suffer the so-called "hearsay dangers" of
insincerity, ambiguity, memory loss, and misperception, machine sources potentially
suffer "black box" dangers that could lead a factfinder to draw the wrong inference
from information conveyed by a machine source. A machine does not exhibit a
character for dishonesty or suffer from memory loss. But a machine's programming,
whether the result of human coding or machine learning, could cause it to utter a
falsehood by design. A machine's output could be imprecise or ambiguous because of
human error at the programming, input, or operation stage, or because of machine
error due to degradation and environmental forces. And human and machine errors
at any of these stages could also lead a machine to misanalyze an event. Just as
the "hearsay dangers" are believed more likely to arise and remain undetected when
the human source is not subject to the oath, physical confrontation, and
cross-examination, black box dangers are more likely to arise and remain undetected
when a machine utterance is the output of an "inscrutable black box."

174

The Confrontation Clause is the appropriate place to root
protections against these risks. Though helpful in some ways, the rules
of evidence should not alone protect defendants from machine
accusers-nor have they, in practice, adequately succeeded in doing
so. 175 The Supreme Court made clear in Crawford and Davis that the

critical rights the Confrontation Clause protects were not to be left to
the "vagueries of evidence."1 7 6 Protecting the right of confrontation
through evidence rules is also undesirable because alleged violations of
evidence rules are subject to a lower level of review. On appeal,
Confrontation Clause claims are generally reviewed de novo, whereas
evidentiary rulings are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.17 7 A
Sixth Amendment-based right will also better reach the state courts
than one grounded in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Finally, courts also
seem to regard the right to confront and cross-examine under the
Confrontation Clause with more onus than the hearsay rules of
evidence.178 Given the powerfully incriminating evidence machine
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/queensland-authorities-confirm-miscode-affects-dna-evidence-in-criminal-cases/news-story/833c580d3f1c59039efdla2ef55af92b
[https://perma.cc/N2DK-N6D9].
Roth, supra note 9, at 1977-78 (internal footnotes and citations omitted). But see
174.
Saltzburg, supra note 125 (arguing the absence of Confrontation Clause or hearsay problems and
that authentication is sufficient on bases other than actual testing of analysts' testimony).
See, e.g., Sites, supra note 17, at 45.
175.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004).
176.
177.
See, e.g., United States v. Suhl, 885 F.3d 1106, 1115 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 172 (2018); United States v. Kizzee, 877 F.3d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 842 (6th
Cir. 2006).
178.
See, e.g., United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053, 1061-63 (5th Cir. 1997), opinion
modified on reh'g, 116 F.3d 119 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Although the scope of cross examination is within
the discretion of the district court, that discretionary authority comes about only after sufficient
cross examination has been granted to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. . . . [U]ntil we determine that
the cross examination satisfied the Sixth Amendment, the district court's discretion does not come
into play.").
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accusers generate, the Confrontation Clause is the most appropriate
source of protection for criminal defendants.
A. Confronting Uiich Machines?
It remains to be determined what this right would be. Assuming
a constitutional right does exist, what does it mean to confront a
machine? There is little utility in putting the machine in the witness
chair. But even that question skips the essential prior inquiry: To which
machines would it apply? This Section addresses both questions. As a
general matter, though, like the Confrontation Clause rule generally,17 9
this right should be limited to testimonial accusations made by
machines. And like the traditional Confrontation Clause protections, it
wouldbe a guarantee of "an opportunity for effective cross-examination,
not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish." 18 0
As a starting point, it is important to note that not all statements
generated by or in connection with a machine require any new
rule-they are already subject to the Clause because they are purely
human statements. For example, a statement made by a human but
then inputted into a word processor would not, by virtue of the use of a
printer and word processing software, become a machine's statement.
Similarly, human assertions that are reduced to a machine record are
also clearly subject to the Clause. For example, a printout of prior
driving infractions-i.e., statements by human agents reporting that
the driver had prior infractions entered into a database by a human
agent-does not become "machine generated" merely because a printer,
a computer, and database software generated it after someone
manually inputted that data. 181 These are simply human reports
repeated by a machine, and they are already subject to the Clause if the
original human reports were testimonial.
Similarly, if an analyst writes down data displayed by a
machine-or other facts about what the machine did related to testing
(the noises it made, error lights that did or did not illuminate,
etc.)-that record is still human generated and subject to the

179.
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-62.
180.
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985).
181.
But see Commonwealth v. Carter, 80 Va. Cir. 527, 534-35 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010)
(concluding that a transcript of driving records that were entered by DMV clerks was not the
statement of a witness because it was "generated by a machine and presented without human
analysis or interpretation"). The transcript was also admissible because, inter alia, it was not
created in anticipation of a trial but instead for normal DMV purposes, such as issuing driver's
licenses and tax assessments. See id.
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Confrontation Clause if testimonial. 182 The mere fact that a machine
was involved in the process does not alter that, ultimately, a human
created the assertion about what happened. In essence, the human
scrivener is serving as an eyewitness to the machine's actions. The
report of an eyewitness, when testimonial, is classic Confrontation
Clause territory.
The same holds true when an analyst is entering testimonial
information into a forensic tool. Just as the report of a traffic officer
remains the statement of a human even when entered into a traffic
offense database, so too are assertions by lab analysts entered into
forensic equipment. For example, if an analyst using a machine enters
an identification number for the defendant's sample, that entry is the
analyst's statement even when a machine later repeats it in the final
report. For all of these areas, machine assistance notwithstanding, the
human statements repeated by a machine are subject to the
Confrontation Clause. This is not the machine-testimony doctrine or a
new test for machine accusers: it is the present test applied in a manner
that recognizes that the mere presence of a machine does not constitute
a machine statement.
B. Machine Accusers: DistinguishingCategories
Machine accusers operate across a spectrum of autonomy: some
require significant human direction and control, but others operate
more independently. For many devices, a human will have virtually no
involvement in the generation of its data once the machine is set in
motion. An increasingly wide variety of devices make assertions about
reality with no ongoing human assistance, including digital
thermometers and weather-tracking devices, license plate scanners,
GPS devices, and so forth. They require the assistance of their human
progenitors to come into being, but as detailed elsewhere, 183 the
assertions produced by autonomous machines should be treated as the
machine's "statements."1 8 4 Though there is no right to cross-examine a

182.
See, e.g., Robertson v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 531, 562-63 (Va. Ct. App. 2013) (en
bane) (prices of stolen items reported by a cash register but written down by a human).
183.
See Sites, supra note 17, at 55, 71-72.
184.
Id. at 71-72. It is not hard to imagine exceptions to this conclusion, nor is it hard to
imagine situations in which the programmers of the independent machine would be subject to the
Confrontation Clause's reach. See id. at 76. For example, if a machine or software was designed,
programmed, or otherwise calibrated to investigate a particular event or entity, that could be a
formal action undertaken with the primary purpose of generating evidence. See id. That could be
sufficient involvement to consider the statements also attributable, in part, to the progenitor and
could also be considered testimonial. See id. In that case, the human who unleashed the machine
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human operator in this case (as there is no such person present), and
there is also no right to cross-examine the progenitors, 185 there should
still be a right of confrontation pertaining to the machine itself; this
Article returns to that question momentarily.
But many other machines are not autonomous. They require the
assistance of a human agent to set parameters or otherwise operate the
machine. For these semiautonomous machines, the relationship is
almost symbiotic: the machine and operator work in tangent, to varying
degrees, to produce an assertion. Thus, the Confrontation Clause
analysis for machine accusers must have at least two categories: one for
machines that speak with human involvement, and another for the
confrontation right as to machine accusers that speak on their own.186
C. CategoryI: Symbiotic Statements for Assertive Machines
The first category contains assertive data generated by a
machine with nontrivial human involvement in the machine's present
operation. For example, if a technician uses a machine with the goal of
making an assertion about reality, the resulting assertion (i.e., the
accusation) is computed by the machine, but only at the direction of its
operator. Given the significant rights of the criminal defendant, the
human's nontrivial involvement in the machine's actions, and the
substantial risks of fraud and error demonstrated above, the human
should be considered a coauthor of the resulting statement. After all,
the human used a machine built to functionally replace human agents,
used it with the intent of making an assertion with its assistance, and
ultimately created the sought-after assertion. It is unjust to restrict the
defendant's constitutional right to cross-examination merely because
the state has replaced human witnesses with machine accusers.
In using the assertive machine, the analyst need not have
intended to reach a particular outcome (e.g., "the DNA does/does not
match" or "the sample is/is not cocaine"). It is sufficient that the analyst
intended to make an assertion in the same manner that prior-era
analysts would, for example, have mixed reagents to produce data and
then reported them afterwards. If the resulting statement was made
on the target would be subject to cross-examination about "the machine's" conclusions. That
possibility and others are discussed in "Rise of the Machines." See id.
185.
See id. at 90-91.
There are other kinds of statements besides these two categories, such as maintenance
186.
records, calibration records, and assertions related only to chain of custody. See id. at 76-78. As
this Author has detailed elsewhere, these are usually sufficiently removed from the machine
statements so as to be regarded as outside the scope of a right to confront machine accusers (many
of these, for example, are simply not testimonial or are too removed from assertive conduct to
trigger the Clause). See id. at 71, 76-78.
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with a primary purpose of use at a future trial, it is a testimonial
assertion, and the human operator should be subject to the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 187 The same should be true
when a semiautonomous machine built to make assertions about reality
in place of human agents is used to do precisely that. This evolution
would not only breathe life into the Clause in an era of semiautonomous
machines, it would also restore an important disincentive against the
lab scandals that have plagued criminal cases.
Triggering this right should require only minimal oversight or
input on the part of the human agent. First, a broad right triggered by
minimal human involvement will better protect defendants against
falsified results and significant testing errors. Second, as described
above, where an assertive machine is replacing a human witness, it is
unjust to deny the defendant the constitutional right that would
otherwise attach. Third, even if that rationale is rejected and the
analyst's operation of the machine is not deemed sufficient to attribute
the machine accusation to the human operator, the analyst has
functionally adopted the machine's statement by proceeding with it.
When the human's operation of the machine is nontrivial and the
operator submits the results to a supervisor, the operator inherently
asserts that they are valid, truthful, accurate results about the sample
at issue.188 That assertion-whether treated as a separate assertion
that the results are accurate or seen as an adoption of the machine's
conclusion-should subject the operator to the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause. As a result, the human operator, even when
playing a minor role in the machine's assertions, should be treated as a
functional coauthor of the machine's accusation. The result is that the
Confrontation Clause requires operators exerting nontrivial control
over an assertive machine to testify when they together generate a

187.
The machine will also be subject to the Clause, as detailed infra, but that will of course
not consist of on-the-stand cross-examination.
188.
See Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE

§ 4.12.5

(2019)) (making a similar

point); cf United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2013) (addressing this point
as to an interpreter's implicit assertions in proffering a translation). This Author acknowledges,
in making this point, that he is arguing against himself. See Sites, supra note 17, at 67, 97-98
(arguing the implicit-assertion theory would reach too far). The examples this Author offered
previously, in hindsight, are actually reasonable bases to trigger the Confrontation Clause since
they are assertions about matters in a testimonial capacity. See id. at 67. The implicit-assertion
theory would not reach calibration and maintenance technicians because, as described previously,
their actions are undertaken without any nonhypothetical use at trial on the horizon. See id. at
97-98. Thus, the implicit-assertion component is a valid basis to subject machine operators to the
Clause. See id.
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testimonial report (unless they are unavailable and there was a prior
opportunity).
Adapting to this requirement will likely be a significant
challenge for many entities in the criminal justice system, including
forensic labs, but it should not be an unreasonable strain on state and
federal resources because it is what courts should be requiring entities
to do already. Many of these analysts should already be subject to
confrontation on the basis of their assertion-entered into the machine
or otherwise logged-that the data the machine produced were about
the defendant's actual sample (or whatever the sample's origin,
including the crime scene, the victim, the murder weapon, etc.). An
assertion that "test results 123 came from sample ABC" is essential to
most lab results, and it is an assertion made where "the primary, if not
indeed the sole, purpose of the [interaction] was to investigate a possible
crime." 189 Thus, the analyst should already be one the Confrontation
Clause requires to testify. 19 0 Courts should have been requiring such
testimony from the beginning, and the above-described coauthor
analysis simply restores that balance. Without support that the test
results actually correspond to the sample collected from the crime scene
or from the defendant, the data are functionally useless to the
factfinder. It is an integral aspect of the accusation against the
defendant: the lab results are incriminating because the lab results are
actually about the defendant.
This analysis strikes a balance between protecting defendants
and setting a reasonable number of machine operators that are subject
to confrontation. Not all machines will fall under this test because it
focuses on the use of machines to make assertions about reality. To
trigger confrontation under this analysis, four requirements must be
met:
1. A human operator must have exercised some minimal level of
control over the machine's operation,
2. The machine must be one intended to make assertions about
reality,
3. The machine must have been used in that assertive capacity
for the data at issue, and

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 815 (2006).
189.
190.
See, e.g., Richard Friedman, Thoughts on Melendez-Diaz: The Product of
Machines, CONFRONTATION BLOG, (Dec. 18, 2008, 1:43 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2008/12/thoughts-on-melendez-diaz-product-of.html
[https://perma.cc/D7NK-CYLE]
(discussing these problems as "the input proposition" and "the output proposition").
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4. The context surrounding the use of the machine must have
been for a primary purpose of use at trial.
To exempt machine accusations made in these circumstances is
to ignore the reality that society is creating machines to replace the
assertive role humans have occupied in criminal trials for centuries
and, ultimately, to set the Confrontation Clause on a path to virtual
extinction. That outcome is inconsistent with the Court's concerns in
Crawford, Bullcoming, and Melendez-Diaz, it ignores the decades of lab
scandals that continue to jeopardize the rights of (potentially
innocent) 191 criminal defendants, and it disregards the reality that
many forensic machines require human guidance.
This rule, however, would represent a sea change in the current
jurisprudence, since most courts have concluded that the machine is the
speaker and the operator need not be subject to confrontation. 192
Relying instead on testimony from surrogate analysts and supervisors,
courts have broadly accepted a some -testimony-is-good-enough
approach to machine accusations and the Confrontation Clause. But
testimony from surrogate analysts is not a reliable way to catch forensic
errors: unless the surrogates are complicit in the malfeasance, they will
be unaware of it and thus largely unable to fulfill the rationale for
the crucible of cross-examination. Accepting surrogate testimony
ultimately serves as a shield against cross-examining the only people
who are likely to know about errors-the original machine operator. 193
The Confrontation Clause ensures reliability through a specific
lens: confrontation. The right to force an accuser to stand before the
factfinder for his or her credibility and believability to be assessed is
antediluvian. It is that process to which lab analysts using assertive
machines should be subject. The analyst and the machine are, in the
191.
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 651-52 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004). A
guilty defendant, of course, has the same rights under the Confrontation Clause. Bryan H.
Wildenthal, The Right of Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and the Power and Limits of Textualism,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1367 (1991). This Author makes this parenthetical point only
to remind that the powerfully incriminating data machines produce will inevitably lead to
the conviction of additional innocent individuals if courts broadly shield machine operators
from cross-examination, as most courts have done thus far. Cf Heather Murphy, A Leading
Cause for Wrongful Convictions: Experts Overstating Forensic Results, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
20,
2019)
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/us/wrongful-convictions-forensic-results.html [https://perma.cc/D5MD-MPBU]; Jon Schuppe, NBC NEWS, Epic Drug Lab Scandal
Results in More than 20,000 Convictions Dropped (Apr. 18,
2017, 9:50 PM)
https://www.nbenews.com/news/us-news/epic-drug-lab-scandal-results-more-20-000-convictionsdropped-n747891 [https://perma.cc/4CW5-ZZZV].
192.
See supra PartII.
193.
See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318-19 (2009); Bullcoming, 564 U.S. 647,
659-61.
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case of accusatory results, leveling powerfully incriminating tools
against the defendant. Just as the defendant has a right to put a human
accuser to the stand-to gauge his reactions and eye contact and to let
the jury see if the operator "m[ight] feel quite differently when he has
to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by
distorting or mistaking the facts"-so too does a defendant accused by
a machine have the right to test the operator's claims of diligence and
truthfulness.1 9 4
Recognizing the role of the operator does not fully address
semiautonomous machine accusers; however, the machine, even though
not fully autonomous, plays an essential role in the accusation
generated with its handler. Thus, in addition to the ability to confront
the operator, courts must adopt a right to "confront" the
semiautonomous machine as well. It is to that question that this Article
turns next.
D. Category II: AL, NAl, and True Machine Accusers
How should courts address the assertions made by machines,
both those that are fully autonomous after initial human setup and
those that speak with nontrivial assistance from operators? As
machines become increasingly automated and perform increasingly
more assertive tasks once undertaken by human witnesses, the
accused's right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" will
recede further toward extinction unless the Sixth Amendment, like
other constitutional rights, evolves with societal changes.19 5 Although
the Confrontation Clause seeks to ensure reliability through
confrontation and cross-examination, where those tools are not feasible
in the traditional sense, the Clause must promote its goal of reliability
through other methods. Thus, in addition to the right to confront
operators in Category I, criminal defendants should have the right to
ensure not only that the operator used the machine correctly but also
that the machine produced a reliable accusation.
Such an approach is not without precedent. For example, courts
have adopted special requirements under the Confrontation Clause and
rules of evidence for admission of canine evidence (e.g., the dog must be
shown to possess sufficient skill in tracking/substance detection, the
handler must be shown to have sufficient proficiency, the canine

194.

Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 375-376 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting ZECHARIAH

CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 35 (1956)).

195.

See supra Part IV.
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handler must testify, etc.) 196 and translations by interpreters (e.g., the
interpreter must be shown to have sufficient skill, the interpreter must
be shown to have no motive to mislead, the interpreter must testify,
etc.). 197 So, too, should there now be special requirements for reports
generated by semiautonomous and autonomous machine accusers. The
contours of the right are, in many ways, less important than the
recognition that such a right must exist, and there are innumerable
ways this could be achieved.
Familiar rules are often the most effective, and a potential
starting point would be constitutionalizing evidentiary requirements.1 9 8
The evidentiary right of authentication is one such option in that it
would demand assurance that the machine "produced scientifically
sound results" and it would inquire directly whether the sample tested
was actually the sample at issue.199 Many evidence codes already
require that "the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is."2 00 The court

is to "[serve] as [a] gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has
offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably
find that the evidence is authentic." 201 Thus, this approach would
simply be empowering that evidence-based right by embedding it in the
Sixth Amendment. To the extent courts have not been enforcing this
evidence-based rule for machine accusers thus far,202 it would provide a
more potent version demanding future enforcement.
A central objection to this approach is that it is too close to the
approach the Court rejected in Crawford and subsequent cases.
Crawford and Davis made clear that the Confrontation Clause was not
to be left to the "vagueries of evidence." 203 Elevating evidence-based
rules for machine accusers falls within that ambit. Thus, even assuming

196.
See, e.g., Sites, supra note 17, at 63-65 (discussing Confrontation Clause cases
involving canines).
197.
See id. at 61. (collecting and discussing cases in both areas and analyzing their role in
interpreting the machine-generated testimony doctrine).
198.
Cf. United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
199.
United States v. Crockett, 586 F. Supp. 2d 877, 886 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
200.
FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
201.
United States v. Kaixiang Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 257 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
202.
See, e.g., United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012). But see
State v. Brown, 818 S.E.2d 735, 740-41 (2018) (general acceptance of GPS technology "does
not . . . translate to the State getting a pass from making a minimum showing that the GPS
records it seeks to introduce into evidence are accurate" where testimony of GPS operator "shed
no light on the accuracy of the GPS records").
203.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004).
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courts were persuaded to reinterpret the Confrontation Clause, doing
so in this manner could be undesirable.
With that concern in mind, the Court could adopt a literal
version of confrontation and cross-examination. Because it is often
impracticable to bring the machine accuser to the defendant's trial,
courts could permit the defendant to "confront" the machine where it
resides (i.e., in a lab, etc.)-presumably this would occur through an
expert witness, though the defendant would have a right to be present.
In this sense, "confront" does not have the same dignitary function that
requiring one's accuser to stand face-to-face at trial has for
eyewitnesses and the like. However, it would still serve the Clause's
reliability-based concerns through the cross-examination it would
enable.
Cross-examination in this format would have to evolve in
response to the nature of the machine accuser. Since many machine
accusers currently cannot be cross-examined through speech about
their skill and expertise, the defendant would have the right to test that
proficiency through the language the machine speaks. For example,
breathalyzers could be tested using known samples so as to
demonstrate their accuracy; DNA equipment could be required to show
its ability to match samples from the same source, and so on. And since
the defendant cannot question the machine about the evidence
incriminating him or her, the defendant would have a right to submit
the samples for independent testing at a facility the defendant selected.
Finally, since the machine could not be questioned about its motive, its
diligence, or its calibration, the prosecution would be required to show
that the machine was programmed and built in a manner that did not
evidence bias and was maintained and operated in a manner that
produced reliable results. Failure on any of these prongs would, as
under the Clause, normally require exclusion of the evidence. As with
many other rights, defendants could waive these requirements.
Running extra tests, inquiring into a machine's programming,
and studying a machine's accuracy are not what the Confrontation
Clause was envisioned to provide when it was adopted. But neither was
it likely envisioned that humans would build machines en masse to
assume the mantle of witness. Given that development and the vital
rights the Clause protects, protections such as these are the best
available equivalents for autonomous machine accusers to the crucible
of cross-examination.
Both approaches-constitutionalizing evidentiary rules and
adopting a more literal confrontation right for machines-will require
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labs to restructure their testing procedures, 204 and like many
improvements in recognizing the rights of criminal defendants, they
will come at a cost. But "[i]t is a truism that constitutional protections
have costs." 2 0 5 In addition, the relevant parties can mitigate that

burden. For example, states can adopt statutory schemes that require
the defendant to assert these rights by a certain stage of trial or waive
them automatically. Forensic labs can also adjust their procedures to
address the need for in-court appearances. Recognizing and restoring
the rights of criminal defendants as to machine accusers will impose a
strain on multiple parties, especially in the period of transition away
from the current model where multiple technicians or analysts are
involved in the development of test results. But forensic labs stand on
tenuous ground in broadly objecting to a right to confront machine
accusers: the need for these protections comes in part from labs' failure
to police their analysts and avoid the tide of scandals plaguing the
nation. 206
In summary, for assertive machines that are semiautonomous
where the operator exercises nontrivial control-and in this sense,
"nontrivial" is a very low threshold-the operator would be subject to
the Confrontation Clause's requirements. For the machine accusers
themselves, both autonomous and not, where the statement was
generated with a primary purpose of use at a future trial, the defendant
would be entitled to the functional equivalents of confrontation and
cross-examination described above.
V. CONCLUSION
This is just the beginning of trial by machine. In an era of
machine accusers, to ignore that reality is to sacrifice the rights of
criminal defendants in the name of technology and efficiency.
Humankind has a penchant for building machines to do what was once
its own province, and machines that make assertions about reality
are just the latest iteration. When those assertions are leveled
against a defendant in a criminal case, they become machine
accusations-statements that, if made by humans, would have been
squarely within the bounds of the Confrontation Clause.

204.
See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 332-33 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the various individuals involved in forensic drug analysis and arguing that
a rule requiring calling all of them to testify "for all practical purposes, forbid[s] the use of scientific
results in criminal trials").
205.
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988).
206.
Crime Lab and Forensic Scandals, supra note 124 (listing numerous alleged forensic
lab scandals); see also supra, Part IV (citing examples of lab scandals).
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Courts must respond to these developments. Many courts have
held that the rules of evidence are the proper tool to protect a
defendant's rights as to machine testimony, but the jurisprudence in
that area indicates that either the rules are not up to the challenge or
courts are unwilling to hold litigants to the task. The Confrontation
Clause is the proper place to ground protections against machine
accusers given its historical importance in the realm of human
witnesses. Constitutionalizing familiar but strengthened evidentiary
protections is one compromise to restore the rights of criminal
defendants, but adopting more stringent confrontation and
cross-examination equivalents is the best path forward. Again,
however, the contours of the right are less important than the
recognition that such a right must exist. Whatever approach courts
adopt, it will come at a cost, but that is the nature of constitutional
protections.
The need for the Confrontation Clause to play its role in
protecting criminal defendants does not mean that it must do so alone.
Other improvements-such as improved regulation of forensic labs and
machines-are welcome. 207 But "[j]ust as reliability was neither the
touchstone nor constitutionally sufficient in Crawford, so too is
regulation an inadequate substitute for what the Constitution
commands: the right to confront one's accusers." 208 The Confrontation
Clause should empower defendants to confront machine accusers just
as it empowers defendants to confront the human accusers the
machines replaced. Forensic labs, law enforcement, and innumerable
others increasingly direct machines to assume the mantle of accuser;
the natural response is that the right to confront one's accuser reach
them as well.

207.
See, e.g., Roth, supra note 9, at 2023-25 (discussing "front-end design, input, and
operation protocols," such as "requir[ing] any software-driven system used in litigation to be
certified as having followed software industry standards in design and testing").
208.
Sites, supra note 7, at 26.

